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Abstract A single counterfactual conditional can have a multitude of interpretations
that differ, intuitively, in the connection between antecedent and consequent. Using
structural equation models (SEMs) to represent event dependencies, we illustrate
various types of explanation compatible with a given counterfactual. We then
formalize in the SEM framework the notion of an acceptable explanation, identifying
the class of event dependencies compatible with a given counterfactual. Finally, by
incorporating SEMs into possible worlds, we provide an update semantics with the
enriched structure necessary for the evaluation of counterfactual conditionals.
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1 Introduction
Counterfactuals are used to talk about things we know to be false, as well as things
we are simply unsure of. For example, (1) can be used if the speaker knows that
Alice did not attend the party, or if the speaker is unsure whether she did; (2) would
typically be uttered by a speaker who believes that the movie was not, in fact, any
good.
(1) If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have stayed home.
(2) If the movie had been any good, I wouldn’t have fallen asleep.
(3) Even if there hadn’t been traffic, Francis still would have been late.
Nonetheless, despite describing states of affairs that are counter to fact or uncertain,
counterfactuals are used to communicate about the actual world. This happens in
two ways. First, counterfactuals can encode information about the truth values of
events in the actual world. For instance, (1) often implies that Alice in fact did not
attend the party, and that Bill did. The Even...still construction in (3) communicates
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that in fact there was traffic, and in fact Francis was late. Accommodation of this sort
of presupposed content (as in Stalnaker 1974) is one way in which counterfactual
statements can serve to update our knowledge of the actual world.
In this paper, however, we focus on a second sense in which counterfactual
conditionals are informative: namely, they encode information about a connection
between the antecedent and consequent.
1.1 Acceptable explanations
Generally speaking, the felicitous utterance of a counterfactual conditional is com-
patible with a multitude of possible connections between the antecedent and the
consequent. Consider, for example, the utterance in (1); while it certainly encodes
some sort of connection between Alice’s being at the party and Bob’s being at the
party, it is silent about the specifics. Perhaps Bob is avoiding Alice, as in (4).
(4) X: If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have stayed home.
Y: Why?
X: He owes her some money.
Of course, there are many explanations for why Bob might be avoiding Alice, of
which (4) represents only one: perhaps Bob dislikes Alice, or he is just shy; perhaps
Alice is Bob’s committee chair, to whom he owes a draft. But the space of possible
explanations is even wider than this: consider the discourse in (5).
(5) X: If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have stayed home.
Y: Why?
X: They hate these sorts of functions, so they take turns going.
In this case, Bob isn’t avoiding Alice at all; rather, there is some shared reason for
their attendance choices. (5) explicitly provides one such reason, but again there are
many others. Perhaps they share a budget and can’t both afford to go. Or perhaps
they share a child and must ensure that he is supervised.
The multitude of explanations compatible with an utterance of (1) seems endless.
Yet it also seems to be governed by certain rules, as shown by the infelicitous
exchanges in (6).
(6) X: If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have stayed home.
Y: Why?
X1: # Bob sometimes doesn’t attend these parties.
X2: # Alice is dead.
X3: # She owes him some money.1
1 Of course, with a few contortions one can read this response as felicitous (e.g., perhaps Bob does
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In this paper, we identify the class of acceptable explanations for a given counterfac-
tual by formalizing the connection between antecedent and consequent. As we have
seen, the truth value of a counterfactual alone is not enough to determine the nature
of this connection. Moreover, the standard semantic accounts of counterfactuals
using similarity relations gloss over this issue altogether by abstracting away from
the mechanisms that connect the truth of the antecedent to the truth of consequent.
We present a model for counterfactuals that embraces their explanatory underspecifi-
cation by explicitly modeling dependencies between events, and we explore some of
the insights that arise from this way of thinking. In particular, our definitions in §3.2
imply that the three infelicitous responses in (6) exhaust the semantic obstructions
to an explanation being acceptable.
2 Overview
2.1 Informativity
Traditionally, semanticists and philosophers of language call something informative
when it meaningfully reduces the context set—the set of live possibilities as to how
the world might be, with respect to the current discourse. Such possibilities are often
conceptualized as possible worlds, in which case the context set might be thought
of as the set of worlds that could plausibly be the actual world. Roughly speaking,
then, an utterance is informative if it eliminates some (but not all) candidate worlds
under consideration. A simple utterance of a declarative sentence which encodes the
proposition ϕ , for example, partitions the universe of possible worlds into ϕ-worlds
and ¬ϕ-worlds, and then rules out all the ¬ϕ-worlds, effectively removing any
¬ϕ-worlds still in the context set.
We subscribe to essentially the same notion of informativity, but because we aim
to explicitly model the connections between events, our analysis relies on a richer
notion of possible worlds than is standard. Specifically, in addition to encoding
the truth values of events, our worlds will encode the dependencies among them,
following Starr (2012) and Briggs (2012). This enrichment provides an additional
means by which to discriminate among possible worlds. As is the case classically, we
can form partitions based on the truth value of a specific event, but now we can also
partition based on the existence (or non-existence) of a particular dependency. That
is, if an utterance asserts the existence of some dependency d, we can model that
assertion’s update as dividing the universe into d-worlds (worlds with that particular
dependency) and ¬d-worlds (worlds without that particular dependency), and then
remove worlds in the standard way.
not want Alice to settle her debt), but this returns us to a scenario in which Bob is avoiding Alice, as
opposed to the natural interpretation in which Alice is avoiding Bob.
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In sum, we rely upon the standard notion of informativity, but with an additional
dimension along which to partition. A dependency-conveying assertion is informa-
tive if and only if updating by that dependency meaningfully reduces the context
set.
2.2 The similarity approach
The standard approach to counterfactuals, often called the similarity approach, relies
on a similarity relation to encode a notion of closeness between worlds (Lewis 1973,
1979). Roughly speaking, a counterfactual conditional is true on this account just in
case the closest worlds where the antecedent is true are worlds where the consequent
is true; however, nothing explains why this is the case—no explicit mechanism
connects the two propositions.
Our analysis relies on no such relation: all of the work done by the similarity
relation is accomplished instead by reference to the dependencies among events
encoded within individual worlds. Moreover, this dependency structure permits a
finer-grained analysis of the truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals than
is possible using similarity relations, allowing us to explore the rules governing
acceptable explanations.
2.3 Structural equation models
We make use of structural equation models (SEMs) to represent event dependencies.
This framework goes back as far as Wright 1921, but we work with the version
formalized by Pearl (2000). An SEM can be pictured as a graph consisting of nodes,
edges, and labels. Each node, represented as a lettered circle, stands for an event
variable. Each edge, represented as an arrow between two nodes, reflects a directed
dependency between events. Finally, the labels encode the specific nature of these
dependencies. In this paper we restrict our attention to SEMs that are two-valued
(i.e., variables are either true or false) and deterministic (i.e., the value of a child
node is a function of the values of its parents, as opposed to a relation specified
probabilistically).
In §3.2 we provide formal definitions; for now, we focus on examples. Consider
first the SEM depicted in Figure 1, which includes two abstract events, X and Y , and
encodes a dependency of Y on X . More precisely, the label stipulates that Y gets the
same truth value as X : if X is true then Y is true, and if X is false then Y is false.
This is in keeping with a general principle of (deterministic) SEMs, namely that the
value of a child node is determined entirely by the value(s) of its parent node(s).
Consider now the SEM depicted in Figure 2, and recall the counterfactual
conditional in (1).
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X Y
Y = X
Figure 1: A simple structural equation model.
A B
B = ¬A
Figure 2: The direct cause explanation of (1).
(1) If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have stayed home.
If we let the variable A stand for “Alice goes to the party”, while B stands for “Bob
goes to the party” (and we assume for simplicity that Bob not going to the party is
equivalent to Bob staying home), then this SEM represents one particularly simple
way of spelling out the relationship between Alice and Bob’s party attendance:
Alice’s attending the party directly causes Bob to stay home.
In some contexts, this level of detail may be appropriate. But in other cases,
such an explanation will fall short of the conversationally appropriate standards
for specificity (we discuss this further in §4.1). What is it about Alice attending
the party that results in Bob’s absence? Insofar as such details are relevant to the
discourse, they ought to be encoded in the common ground. In this regard, SEMs
furnish the needed structure: more elaborate explanations can be captured by more
sophisticated SEMs; moreover, different types of explanations can be characterized
by the structural properties of the SEMs that realize them.
2.3.1 Additional causes
One plausible explanation for (1) is that Bob hates Alice and does not want to spend
time with her; because of this, he avoids parties that she attends. In keeping with
this intuition, we can represent Bob’s hatred-driven-avoidance of Alice as an extra
node H in the model, as in Figure 3.
In this model, the consequent (Bob’s attendance) is still dependent on the an-
tecedent (Alice’s attendance), but not solely so. As we can see from the equation that
describes how B inherits its value, the truth value of the consequent now depends
5
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H
H =>
A B
B = ¬(A∧H)
Figure 3: An additional cause explanation of (1).
A C
C = A
B
B = ¬C
Figure 4: An intermediate cause explanation of (1).
both on the antecedent and on an additional cause. Specifically, Alice’s attendance
causes Bob to stay home under the background assumption that Bob hates Alice.
Note the importance here of fixing Bob’s hatred (represented by the structural equa-
tion H =>, where > is the symbol for the logical constant that is always true) in
order to be able to infer his absence from Alice’s attendance.
Of course, there is nothing special about the additional cause in this example
being Bob’s hatred—one can easily imagine a variety of background conditions
under which Alice’s attendance results in Bob’s absence. In this way, the SEM in
Figure 3 can be viewed as a template for a general type of explanation, namely,
those in which certain background events act as preconditions for the required
antecedent-consequent dependence.
2.3.2 Intermediate causes
Another type of explanation for (1) works by mediating the dependence of B on A by
some third event. For example, suppose that Alice brings her cat with her wherever
she goes, and that Bob is deathly allergic to cats and avoids them at all costs. In this
case, Alice’s attendance at the party still leads to Bob’s absence, but only because
of the mediating factor of her cat. This particular scenario is captured by the SEM
depicted in Figure 4.
Here, the node C represents the cat being at the party, while the structural
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T
A
A = T
B
B = ¬T
Figure 5: A common cause explanation of (1).
equations C = A and B = ¬C encode the fact that the cat travels with Alice and
that Bob avoids the cat, respectively. Once again, there is nothing special about the
intermediate cause being a cat; this SEM is simply one of many instantiations of a
general type of explanation characterized by the presence of intermediaries between
antecedent and consequent.
2.3.3 Common causes
There is a third type of explanation importantly different from those considered so
far, in that the consequent need not depend on the antecedent at all. Rather, both the
antecedent and the consequent depend on some common cause that determines (or
at least influences) both of their values. For example, returning to Alice and Bob, we
might imagine that they flip a coin to decide who attends the party. This is captured
in Figure 5.
Here, the node T represents the event that the coin comes up tails; the labels
then guarantee that Alice attends the party if and only if the coin comes up tails, and
Bob attends the party if and only if the coin comes up heads. Note that although this
scenario involves no causal path from A to B, it is nonetheless intuitively compatible
with an utterance of (1).
2.3.4 More complicated models
Of course, several types of explanations may operate simultaneously in a given
SEM. Figure 6 provides one example of a more elaborate causal structure that might
nonetheless count as an explanation for (1). Indeed, it is easy enough to come up
with a plausible story for such a model: a coin is flipped (T ) to determine whether
Alice (A) or Ursula (U) will attend the party; meanwhile, Vivian (V ) avoids Ursula,
and Bob (B) avoids Vivian provided he has not watched the latest episode of his
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T
A
A = T
U
U = ¬T
V
V = ¬U
W
W =⊥
B
B = ¬(V ∧¬W )
Figure 6: A more elaborate explanation of (1)
favorite show (W ), since Vivian follows that show as well and Bob doesn’t want
to hear any spoilers. A given counterfactual may be compatible with any number
of explanations of varying degrees of complexity; exactly which SEMs count as
acceptable explanations is the subject matter of §3.2 (see also §4.1 for a discussion
of other limiting factors).
2.3.5 Backtrackers
Finally, it is instructive to consider what might appear to be another way to ensure
the right kind of covariance between antecedent and consequent: rather than having
the consequent depend on the antecedent, we can reverse this relationship and model
the antecedent as depending on the consequent. Consider, for instance, the SEM
depicted in Figure 7. This sort of model is what has been referred to in the classical
philosophical literature as a backtracker (Lewis 1979): the consequent is the cause
while the antecedent is the effect.
We have accepted various explanations for (1) in which Alice’s party attendance,
one way or another, causes Bob’s absence. But explanations that reverse this
dependency do not seem to be viable: in any context where it is understood that Alice
is avoiding Bob, for example, (1) is infelicitous. Some care must be taken, therefore,
in identifying the space of acceptable explanations; that is, those explanations
compatible with a given counterfactual conditional. It is certainly too much to
insist that there exist a causal path from antecedent to consequent—such a condition
would rule out the common cause type of explanations discussed above. Instead,
we propose the somewhat weaker requirement that there exist no causal path from
consequent to antecedent; this proposal is formalized in §3.2.
It is interesting to note, however, that the backtracking explanation does become
available (and even preferred) under the right syntactic conditions, namely the
double-auxiliary construction:
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A
A = ¬B
B
Figure 7: A classical backtracking explanation.
(7) If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have had to have stayed home.2
Understanding counterfactuals via SEMs provides insight into this linguistic
feature by identifying a natural class of semantic objects—SEMs like the one in
Figure 7—that correspond to the syntactic construction in (7). Moreover, our
exploration of the different types of explanation allows us to distinguish two notions
that seem to have been conflated in the literature. As noted above, in many classical
philosophical accounts a backtracker describes a counterfactual conditional in which
the consequent causally or temporally precedes the antecedent. By contrast, in more
recent psychological literature, the term is applied to any counterfactual that relies
on upstream reasoning, that is, that invokes an explanation involving something
causally or temporally prior to the antecedent (Edwards & Rips 2012; Rips &
Edwards 2013), as for example in Figure 5. These two notions of backtracking
behave quite differently, as evidenced by the fact that the latter, but not the former,
yields an acceptable interpretation of (1). To our knowledge, this distinction has not
been spelled out before now.
3 Formalism
3.1 Underspecification, not ambiguity
We begin by briefly arguing that the multiplicity of interpretations for a given coun-
terfactual is best analyzed not as ambiguity, but rather as semantic underspecification.
Ambiguity is identifiable through the standard VP ellipsis test (see Asher, Hardt &
Busquets 2001, and the many references therein): genuine ambiguity, as in words
like bank (river bank vs. financial institution), is impossible under VP ellipsis. In
the sentences in (8), for example, Janine and Kevin must both be at the same sort of
bank.
2 Or, said differently, “For Alice to have gone to the party, it would have to have been the case that Bob
stayed home.”
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(8) a. Janine went to the bank, and so did Kevin.
b. Janine went to the bank, and Kevin did, too.
We can apply the same test to counterfactuals, as in (9).
(9) a. If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have stayed home, and so would
Eve (have).
b. If Alice had gone to the party, Bob would have stayed home, and Eve
would’ve, too.
Note that in both versions of (9), Bob and Eve can have very different reasons for
not attending the party, even reasons that cut across distinct types of explanation.
For instance, we might have a common cause type explanation for Bob (e.g., a coin
toss), and an intermediate cause type explanation for Eve.3 As such, we formalize
our analysis of counterfactuals using a single, underspecified semantics, rather than
appealing to ambiguity.
3.2 Structural equation models
Here we provide a rigorous development of the SEM framework we employ, and use
it to formalize our proposed semantics for counterfactuals. A structural equation
model is a triple
M = (Var,End,{ϕX : X ∈ End})
where
• Var is a finite set of variables;
• End⊆ Var is the subset of endogenous variables;
• for each X ∈ End, ϕX is a Boolean expression over Var such that X /∈
dom(ϕX).
Here, a Boolean expression over Var is any expression built from the variables in
Var by closing under the Boolean connectives in the standard way; more precisely, it
is any expression generated by the grammar
ϕ ::= X |>|¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ψ |ϕ ∨ψ |ϕ → ψ,
where X ∈ Var. We write dom(ϕ) to denote the set of all variables occurring in the
expression ϕ ; theM -parents of X ∈ End are precisely those variables in dom(ϕX).
3 Notably, though, it seems quite difficult to get a reading of (9) where Bob is avoiding Alice but Alice
is avoiding Eve—that is, mixing a classical backtracker, as in Figure 7, with a non-backtracking
interpretation. That is to say, the classical backtracking interpretation is a different reading.
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TheM -ancestor relation is the transitive closure of theM -parent relation, and we
write Y ≺M X to denote that Y is anM -ancestor of X . We omitM as a prefix and
subscript when it is safe to do so. Note that the presence of the constant formula
> (true) means there are expressions with empty domain, and as such, there may
be endogenous variables with no parents. Following many others (e.g., Hiddleston
2005, Briggs 2012, Kaufmann 2013) we restrict our attention to recursive SEMs,
where the parent relation is acyclic.
Intuitively, the expression ϕX specifies the value of X as a function of the vari-
ables in dom(ϕX) via the structural equation X = ϕX . This intuition is made precise
in the following: a truth assignment forM is a function v : Var→ {true, false}
such that for every X ∈ End, v(X) = v(ϕX), where by (a minor) abuse of notation we
identify v with its standard recursive extension to all Boolean expressions over Var.
Given a Boolean expression ϕ over Var, we writeM  ϕ and say thatM forces ϕ
just in case for all truth assignments v forM , v(ϕ) = true.
Given X ,Y ∈ Var, we wish to identify those SEMsM that count as “acceptable
explanations” of the counterfactual conditional in (10).
(10) If it had been the case that X , it would have been the case that Y .
As a first pass, let us consider those modelsM such thatM  X → Y . To be sure,
the material conditional has long been rejected as a suitable interpretation of natural
language conditionals; in this case, however, the forcing relation provides a certain
universal character that serves to bring the interpretation more in line with what
we might be looking for. More precisely, observe thatM  X → Y just in case
every truth assignment for M that makes X true also makes Y true; that is, the
structural equations inM guarantee that the truth of X implies the truth of Y . At
a high level, this accords with the basic intuition underlying the use of SEMs to
interpret counterfactual conditionals: namely, that they encode precisely the kind of
antecedent-consequent relationships that licence such utterances.
That being said, there are models that force X → Y while failing, intuitively,
to correspond to explanations for the counterfactual in (10). One problematic case
consists in those modelsM for which X cannot be true under any truth assignment;
in this case,M  X → Y holds vacuously. As the impossibility of X seems quite at
odds with (10), we reject it as an acceptable explanation, and formally excise it from
consideration. Define
M  X > Y ⇔ M  X → Y andM 6 ¬X .
One can readily check that each of the SEMs in Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 forces
A>¬B, which bodes well for this definition. On the other hand, the SEM in Figure 7
also forces A>¬B, despite the fact (discussed in §2.3.5) that this kind of explanation
is rejected for standard counterfactual conditionals (i.e., those without additional
syntactic licensing, as in (7)).
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This leads us to a final refinement. Define
M  XY ⇔ M  X > Y and Y 6≺M X .
We callM an acceptable explanation of (10) providedM  X Y . It is easy to
see, by this definition, that the SEMs in Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are all acceptable
explanations of (1), while the SEM in Figure 7 is not.4
It is worth noting that the requirement by which we obtained XY from X >Y —
that Y not be an ancestor of X—is not equivalent to the requirement that X be an
ancestor of Y . There are three logical possibilities: either X ≺Y , or Y ≺ X , or neither
X ≺ Y nor Y ≺ X . The class of SEMs such that M  X Y is thereby naturally
partitioned into two components: those where X is an ancestor of Y , and those where
neither is an ancestor of the other. A canonical example of an SEM that would lie in
the second component is the one pictured in Figure 5, corresponding to the common
cause type of explanation. In other words, essentially the same mechanism that
excises classical backtrackers from the denotation of a counterfactual also serves to
distinguish common cause type explanations from the others.
3.2.1 Extensions
The definition of X >Y is useful as more than just a stepping-stone along the way to
the final formulation of acceptable explanations. The SEMsM that force X >Y but
not X Y have the property that Y ≺M X ; they are our classical backtrackers. As
we saw in §2.3.5, such explanations become acceptable when the counterfactual is
embedded in the right syntactic environment, namely, the double-auxiliary construc-
tion. Apparently, in such cases, the requirement that Y 6≺ X is relaxed. We therefore
propose to take X > Y as the semantic interpretation of counterfactual conditionals
with the double-auxiliary construction.
The definition of XY is a strengthening of the definition of X >Y ; in particular,
X > Y does not exclude non-backtracking explanations. This turns out to account
for two different but related facts about counterfactual conditionals with the double-
auxiliary construction: they seem to bias classical backtracking interpretations while
still allowing (albeit with some difficulty) non-backtracking interpretations. We can
account for the bias by appeal to general Gricean reasoning principles (Grice 1975):
if the speaker is going out of her way to use the strictly weaker X > Y rather than
XY , then she must be doing so because the explanations compatible with XY
are not sufficient. But while this biasing effect makes other interpretations harder to
4 Technically, ¬B 6≺M A is undefined, since ≺M is a relation on variables, not Boolean expressions.
However, to avoid more cumbersome notation, we will suffer this minor abuse, identifying a negated
variable with the variable itself for the purposes of assessing ancestorship.
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get, they are still available, in accordance with the fact that X > Y is consistent with
XY .
We might also entertain a similar analysis of the Even...still construction men-
tioned in §1. These constructions seem to bias models where the truth of the
consequent is fixed. One might argue that modelsM satisfyingM  Y should
not count as explanations of (10), and view the Even...still construction as relaxing
this restriction in just the same way that the double-auxiliary relaxes the Y 6≺ X
restriction. In particular, this would imply that the Even...still construction biases
interpretations where the truth of Y is fixed, which accords well with intuition.
However, it is not clear that all the standard interpretations are still available (even
with effort) when this construction is used; moreover, some speakers report being
able to interpret Y as fixed even without the Even...still construction.
3.3 Update
Having formalized the notion of acceptable explanations in terms of SEMs, we now
describe how to use this framework to capture the effect of asserting counterfactual
conditionals vis-à-vis updating the context set. This requires an enriched notion
of possible worlds that encode more than just truth values—they must also have
something to say about the dependencies between variables. We accomplish this by
having worlds encode SEMs.
A space of structured possible worlds M (over Prop) is a nonempty set W
together with, for each world w ∈W , a structural equation model
Mw = (Prop,Endw,{ϕw,X : X ∈ Endw})
and a truth assignment vw forMw. For each X ∈ Prop, we write (M,w) |= X just in
case vw(X) = true; this is extended to all Boolean expressions over Prop in the usual
way. Thus, each world w encodes the truth or falsity of each Boolean expression
ϕ . But each world also encodes an SEMMw specifying dependencies between
propositional variables; this can be leveraged to define the truth or falsity of a
counterfactual conditional like (10) at a world w as follows:
(M,w) |= XY ⇔ Mw  XY.
Now if we define the extension of ϕ in the usual way,
JϕK = {w ∈W : (M,w) |= ϕ},
then the effect of asserting ϕ can be captured by updating the context set C ⊆W
with C∩ JϕK, as is standard. In particular, since
JXY K = {w ∈W :Mw  XY},
13
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we see that an assertion of a counterfactual like (10) eliminates precisely those
worlds w where the associated SEMMw is not an acceptable explanation of (10).
4 Discussion
4.1 Competing explanations
Recall that the double-auxiliary construction can bias the kind of backtracking
explanation shown in Figure 7. What other biases might exist, and what might
trigger them? It is entirely possible, for instance, that contextual factors can work
to favor some types of explanation over others, or that explanations involving, say,
fewer nodes are generally preferred to more complex ones. We leave a systematic
study of such biasing factors to future work, but we take a moment here to discuss
an issue that lies at the heart of the present enterprise: rejecting explanations.
When might an otherwise acceptable explanation be rejected? For one, we might
wish to reject explanations that run counter to well-known regularities in the world.
For example, if we know the consequent of a counterfactual to be temporally prior
to the antecedent, a dependency of consequent on antecedent is problematic. The
counterfactual in (11), for instance, should not be explained by positing a direct
dependence of Bob’s brunch attendance on Alice’s party attendance.
(11) If Alice hadn’t come to the party this evening, Bob would have attended the
brunch earlier today.
Rather than building this restriction into the notion of an acceptable explanation,
however, we might treat it as encoded in the common ground, as a background
assumption on the part of the conversational participants. Such a move allows us
to make a principled distinction between explanations that are ruled out through
the update process in virtue of their form (i.e., those that are not acceptable, in the
technical sense defined in §3.2), and those that merely fail to be considered live
possibilities (e.g., no world in the context set encodes an SEM in which A≺ B).
Another situation in which we might wish to reject an explanation is when it fails
to conform to some contextually-determined standard of specificity. This is intended
to capture the intuition that we seem to have different expectations for what level
of detail is appropriate in different contexts. For example, while taking a Physics
test, one might expect that a high level of specificity is required (to demonstrate that
one understands the material). By contrast, in a conversation among close friends,
shared knowledge might well allow interlocutors to gloss over a great deal of detail;
to explicitly spell out more than the minimum might even be insulting. Indeed, we
seem to be able to change this specificity parameter on the fly, requesting more detail
than an interlocutor might have thought was necessary: “Why?” is almost always a
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felicitous follow-up in the right kind of conversation; one can always raise the bar
for the level of detail required.5
If a given explanation fails to meet the appropriate standards for specificity in a
conversation—either because it is too detailed or not detailed enough—we might
wish to reject it. As above, such a rejection seems closely tied to what is represented
in the common ground, given that it depends on what is mutually assumed and
expected. How best to model this kind of specificity parameter, however—and how
to represent conversational moves that change it—we leave for future work.
4.2 Predictions for other languages
Our categorization of the different types of explanation was motivated mathemat-
ically, not by any particular facts about English counterfactuals, and so it should
extend to uses of counterfactuals crosslinguistically. However, there is no a priori
reason to predict that all languages use a single, underspecified form for all types
of acceptable explanations, nor that backtracking explanations should always be
differentially marked. A crosslinguistic approach to the modeling of counterfactuals
via SEMs promises to be a rich area of investigation.
5 Conclusion
A single counterfactual may be compatible with a multitude of explanations; in
this paper we have shown how the SEM framework can be utilized to represent
and categorize the event-dependencies relevant to these explanations. This provides
a finer-grained analysis of the truth conditions of counterfactual conditions than
is present in the extant literature. Moreover, by incorporating SEMs into possible
worlds, we are able to bring these insights in line with mainstream compositional
semantics: our notion of update is essentially the standard one operating over an
enriched space of possible worlds.
The resulting system is relevant not only to the analysis of counterfactuals, but for
any linguistic material that is sensitive to the dependencies between events, including
non-counterfactual conditionals. Counterfactuals provide an intuitive entry-point
into such a system, along with natural illustrations as to the value of building models
that encode event dependencies. Applications beyond counterfactuals are left to
future work.
5 Young children often enjoy taking advantage of this conversational move, once they discover it.
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